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This article places recent debates about community cohesion and securitization 
in a wider context; it situates assumptions about the “threats” posed by particular 
communities against the backdrop of urban policy and urban social change in the 
UK. It reveals the way marginalised “communities”, minority ethnic group and white 
working-class, were imagined in New Labour’s urban regeneration policies and 
how they are invoked in the more recent Conservative-led coalition’s proposed 
social and regional policies and their accompanying rhetoric. The discussion also 
makes an assessment of the likely impact of recent economic and social policies for 
neighbourhood change, instability and “security”. It is argued that the ways urban 
communities have been conceptualised reflect, at best, a neglect of the structural 
determinants of urban social life and at worst a deliberate attempt to downplay such 
concerns underpinned by a deeply rooted preoccupation with the problem of rather 
than the problems faced by marginalised communities. 
Introduction
In the first decade of the 21st century the idea that Muslim communities constitute 
a “threat” to Britain’s security as a nation and that communities choose to “self-
segregate” and are living “parallel lives” (Cantle 2001, 9) separate from their 
white neighbours has become “common-sense”. The New Labour governments’ 
responses were to securitize further the borders and to extend and intensify 
surveillance and internal controls (Brown 2010; Pantazis & Pemberton 2009). 
Government interventions not only misidentified the causes of “segregation” but the 
discourses themselves, as well as securitization practices they gave rise to, were 
deeply counterproductive (Communities & Local Government Committee 2010; 
Evans 2011). The Conservative-led coalition government continued in very much 
the same vein: addressing a security conference in Munich on 5th February 2011 
the Prime Minister blamed “state multiculturalism” for encouraging separation and 
segregation. In his view, “we have failed to provide a vision of society to which they 
feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities 
behaving in ways that run counter to our values”. While asserting that he was alive 
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to the distinction between Islam and “Islamic extremism” (BBC 2011a) he made no 
challenge to Islamophobic constructs. 
The discourses around immigration control historically have been punctuated 
with the idea that migrants, especially poor ones, constitute a threat to the “nation” 
and the “security” and “character” of Britain. Although migrants have been held 
responsible for the racism of white Britons, public disorder, lack of urban resources 
– especially housing – and insanitary urban environments (Smith 1989), the nature 
of the “threats” posed to the national or urban order has undergone some shifts 
over time and between minority ethnic groups (Rabin 2006; Pantazis & Pemberton 
2009). In the period following the First World War and the Russian Revolution 
(1917), for example, anti-bolshevism combined with anti-Semitism to label Eastern 
European Jews “bolshies” – a threat the British state tried to manage by designating 
it “a criminal offence for aliens to foster disaffection amongst soldiers and civilians 
or to promote industrial unrest” (Multanen 1999, 49). Blame for housing shortages, 
overcrowding, obsession with the numbers of black migrants and worries about 
miscegenation in the 1950s and 1960s were displaced or augmented from the 
1970s by “common-sense” links between “black culture” and “crime” and (second 
generation) young black people were constructed as a new internal threat to the 
“character” of Britain (Gilroy 1987; Hall et al 1978). Furthermore, “the territorial link 
between a black presence and urban violence” came to predominate in the 1980s 
(Smith 1989, 131 [original emphasis]) following the urban uprisings of that decade, 
which in turn was employed to justify authoritarian policing responses to “contain” 
the threat (Gilroy 1987; Smith 1989). 
The aim of this article is to place more recent debates about securitization and 
community cohesion in a wider context; it situates assumptions about the “threats” 
posed by particular communities against the backdrop of recent urban policy and 
urban social change in the UK. It reveals the way marginalised “communities”, 
minority ethnic groups and white working-class, were imagined in New Labour’s 
urban regeneration policies and how they are invoked in more recent Conservative-
led Coalition policies and their accompanying rhetoric. It is argued that the ways 
urban communities have been conceptualised reflect, at best, a neglect of the 
structural determinants of urban social life and, at worst, deliberate attempts to 
downplay such concerns underpinned by deeply-rooted preoccupation with the 
problem of, rather than the problems faced by, marginalised communities. The 
argument will be developed with a specific focus upon housing and housing policy 
as these are central to the claims of self-segregation and to issues of securitization 
in urban environments.
The following section briefly illustrates why the structural causes of 
“segregation” are so frequently ignored and outlines the broad influences which 
“place” populations in urban space. The paper then discusses how securitization 
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and community cohesion became intertwined in New Labour’s urban policies 
before considering how idealised notions of urban citizenship were pitched against 
“problematic” communities in the quest for renewal. Building on these insights, the 
discussion turns to the way white working-class (“host”) communities have been 
constructed. Finally, the impacts of austerity measures and welfare reform in the 
contemporary setting, which are directly informed by manufactured understandings 
about marginalised communities, are discussed briefly. The social policies pursued 
by the Coalition government signify a departure from its predecessor’s concern 
with cohesion, which was deeply problematic in different ways. The Conservative-
led coalition’s policies are likely, however, to undermine cohesion and community-
relations further. 
Ignoring the Structural Causes of Segregation
Avoiding “race” becoming a political issue was a concern in the minds of 
legislators as Britain negotiated its withdrawal from Empire and place at the head 
of the Commonwealth in the early post-war period (Smith 1989). Laissez-faire 
dispositions towards “race” and “racism” effectively meant no intervention to co-
ordinate housing and migration was attempted at the national level (Smith 1989). 
Failure to acknowledge that intervention was necessary or how racism structured 
access to private housing markets or the growing public housing sector set the 
scene for the spatial patterning of black and ethnic minority ethnic groups which 
still resonates in the UK. Moreover, the “discovery” of segregated spaces, given the 
prevailing assumptions about natural absorption and dispersal, was then viewed as 
a consequence of “choice” on the part of settlers (Smith 1989). Governments ever 
since have defined the causes of segregation in accordance with their ideological 
frameworks and preferred solutions (Smith 1989; Kalra & Kapoor 2009).
A detailed examination of the mechanisms through which “residential 
segregation” was created over the post-war period, the responses (or inaction) of 
governments, and the temperature of “public opinion” to which governments and 
institutions appealed, is of course beyond the scope of this paper (see Smith 1989). 
Suffice to note that racism and disadvantage in the labour and housing markets 
of areas where post-war black and minority ethnic migrants settled1, restructuring 
local labour markets, their interaction with housing markets together with broad 
policy shifts in the way welfare (especially housing) was allocated and organised 
(the movement from slum clearance to renewal in the 1970s, for example) were 
critically important factors (Smith 1989). Throughout the post-war period, however, 
explanations focusing on the material processes shaping the urban spatial order 
have been systematically buried under ones more in keeping with the prevailing 
1 Greater London, West Midlands, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside regions (Smith 1989).
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ideologies of successive governments and appeals to white electorates. In this way 
“residential segregation”
is a symbol in the minds of legislators as well as the arena in which black people 
experience urban life. This construction is informed by a sequence of political ideas 
about “race” and immigration. At any one time, these images determine (and rationalise) 
the range of “solutions” that may be put into effect (Smith 1989, 105-6). 
Because racism and class relations and disadvantage have not been named, the 
“causes” of segregation have been misunderstood and the prescribed “solutions” 
time and again inevitably fail. As Smith (1989) noted,
The 1980s mark the culmination of a long political struggle with a problem termed 
“racial segregation”. Modern legislators are no nearer than their predecessors to 
establishing what it is, or why it persists without marginalising or demeaning the black 
population (143-4). 
New Labour’s conceptualisation of “the problem” and prescribed “solutions” to 
insecurity and “cohesion” from 2001 have operated in much the same way (Kalra 
& Kapoor 2009). 
Insecurity and Cohesion 
The terms of the debate on “residential segregation” and “security” underwent a 
seismic shift in 2001. A criminalisation discourse had been developing towards 
“Asian” (mainly Muslim) men from the late 1980s, especially following the “Rushdie 
Affair” in 1988 (Bowling & Phillips 2002), but the urban disorders in Bradford, 
Burnley and Oldham in the spring and summer of 2001 and, even more, following 
the attacks in New York and on the Pentagon on 11th September led to step change 
in the way Muslim communities were constructed as “problematic” and “suspect” 
(Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Evans 2011). The securitization agenda intensified 
again following the bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (Evans 2011; Brown 
2010); the escalation of internal controls in response to the perceived new danger 
posed by “home grown” terrorists included a trebling of stops and searches by the 
police under section 44 of the Terrorism Act (2000) from 37,197 during 2006-07 to 
117,278 in 2007-08 (Travis 2009)2. This represented an increase of 215% overall 
but of 322% for black people and 277% for “Asian” people; the majority of stops 
took place in the Metropolitan police area (Ministry of Justice 2009, 29-30).
Counter-terrorism policing strategies focused disproportionately on Muslim 
communities, and preoccupations with “security” increasingly penetrated the social 
2  These powers were judged a violation of human rights by the European Court in 2010.
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fabric (Brown 2010; Pantazis & Pemberton 2009). The goals of New Labour’s 
“Contest” and “Contest2” strategies were to prevent “radicalisation”, use “disruption” 
to neutralise the terrorist threat and reduce the likelihood of future attack as well as 
to ameliorate the impact should one occur (Brown 2010; Evans 2011). The “Prevent” 
part of the Contest framework, launched in 2007 and updated in 2009, emphasised 
that “strong and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively reject 
the ideology of violent extremism, isolate apologists for terrorism and provide 
support to vulnerable institutions and individuals” (HM Government 2009, 84). 
The strategy reinforced the link with New Labour’s “community cohesion” and 
“community empowerment” agendas which first took shape in urban policy during 
2001 in the wake of the urban disorders (HM Government 2009, 84). 
The Prevent strategy under New Labour brought together a varied range of 
government departments, agencies and voluntary sector groups under its rubric 
although crucially and critically the police played a pivotal role (Brown 2010; Pantazis 
& Pemberton 2009). However, the fusion of anti-terror and community cohesion 
agendas was vociferously criticised for not only stigmatizing Muslim groups (see 
Evans 2011) but for being contradictory in its aims and counterproductive in its 
practices; it alienated those it ostensibly sought to reach (Communities & Local 
Government Committee 2010)3. More broadly, and in summary, successive pieces 
of anti-terror legislation since 2000, the policies and strategies that underpinned 
these developments and the media and political discourses accompanying them 
served to construct British Muslims as “Others” (Brown, 2010; Pantazis & Pemberton 
2009), who are less than “fully British” and upon whom the responsibility lies to 
make themselves so (Evans 2011).
New Labour’s “community cohesion” and “community empowerment” agendas 
from 2001 were informed by a strand of communitarian philosophy (Robinson 2008) 
in which class divisions went unrecognised, and the mechanisms through which 
power-relations are defended in urban space were rendered incomprehensible as 
a consequence (Haylett 2001; Hancock 2007). The problem of spatial segregation 
was defined through this communitarian lens (Robinson 2008); policy-makers 
barely acknowledged the material problems of economic and “racial” disadvantage 
(McGhee 2005; Kalra & Kapoor 2009). Neither did they appreciate the roles 
played by far right groups in the 2001disorders or in the continued maintenance of 
segregated spaces in British cities (McGhee 2005; Phillips et al 2008; Smith 1989). 
Instead there was a preoccupation with “cultural difference” and a reformulation 
of “segregation” as a problem of residents choosing to live “parallel lives” despite 
the questionable evidence upon which such claims were made (Robinson 2008; 
Phillips et al 2008).
3  The Prevent strategy was reviewed by Lord Carlile in 2011 and the Prevent strategy re-launched 
in June 2011. 
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Muslims were therefore obliged to “de-segregate” and contact and interaction 
between “communities” was seen as the way to debunk the myths which held 
groups apart (McGhee 2005). The Cantle Report (2001) acknowledged economic 
disadvantage among minority ethnic and white communities but the main 
emphasis of the report’s recommendations implied the problem was a technical 
one concerning the delivery of urban policy programmes; unhealthy competition for 
resources had inadvertently been promoted but these problems could be resolved 
with modifications to resource allocation mechanisms. 
New Labour, Renewal and the Ideal Citizen-Consumer
More generally, New Labour placed faith in its flagship urban and social programmes 
to deliver renewal for disadvantaged communities. The National Minimum Wage 
(introduced in1999), programmes such as the New Deal for Communities (launched 
in 1998), the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (2001) and Sure 
Start (1998), for example, in this view would benefit all communities in the most 
disadvantaged areas. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act in 2000 bolstered 
the conviction that racialised minorities would not lose out. The attention of policy 
makers turned to questions of governance: how best to co-ordinate activity across 
government departments, between local authorities and statutory, private and third 
sector partners at local level, strengthening accountability to central government 
through more challenging performance targets, issuing guidance and rolling out 
programmes. 
The Cantle Report (2001) identified housing policies and allocation processes 
as major factors that thwarted community cohesion and also mechanisms through 
which more integrated communities could potentially be created. The report 
recommended:
Housing agencies must urgently assess their allocation systems and development 
programmes with a view to ensuring more contact between different communities and to 
reducing tension. They must also consider the impact on other services, such as youth 
provision and health. It is also essential that more ambitious and creative strategies 
are developed to provide more mixed housing areas, with supportive mechanisms for 
minorities facing intimidation and harassment (2001, 43). 
Indeed, the Review Team expressed frustration that “the impact of housing 
policies on community cohesion seems to have escaped serious consideration 
to date” (2001, 42). Further, they drew attention to the impact of weak housing 
markets – in Burnley dwelling prices had plummeted to between £1500-2000 
per dwelling – and the deleterious impact housing market decline was having on 
community confidence and as a source of discontent and conflict. Nevertheless, 
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they concluded that the “problem of low demand housing is largely outside our 
remit” (2001, 43). 
The role of housing and labour markets together with changes in welfare provision 
and demographic shifts profoundly affect patterns of residential settlement and 
segregation, as we have seen. Such patterning is not “a given” but takes different 
forms in cities subject to broadly similar economic forces and the general thrust 
of state policies (Lee & Murie 2002). Earlier rounds of investment shape later 
developments, and some cities and “sub-markets” within them are more able to 
withstand the impact of changes in their economic fortunes than others (Lee & 
Murie 2002; Cole & Ferrari 2008). Residential settlement patterns are therefore 
complex and nuanced in different localities but the interplay of market activity and 
political interventions by national and local governments are critical factors (Lee & 
Murie 2002). 
Local studies have revealed results at odds with the widely held and officially 
sanctioned presumption that communities are “self-segregating”. Phillips et 
al (2008), for example, noted how British Asian and white young adults in their 
focus groups each viewed mixed neighbourhoods and social spaces positively. 
Their statistical analysis revealed that residential “clustering” diminished between 
1991 and 2001 in Oldham and Rochdale (2008, 82[my emphasis]). Living in some 
proximity to family and ethnic group members was regarded as important for social, 
cultural and economic support, but the main barriers to residential moves were 
associated with low incomes and fear of racist harassment and violence, which 
was particularly worrisome in a context where far right extremism was nurtured 
by “racialised national discourses on asylum and immigration, minority ethnic 
citizenship and belonging” (2008, 81). 
Phillips et al’s (2008) study in Oldham and Rochdale formed part of a larger 
research project for the Housing Market Renewal Initiative (HMRI) Pathfinder 
established in 2002. The HMRI was New Labour’s flagship urban programme 
which aimed to arrest housing market decline of the like outlined by Cantle (see 
above). The Pathfinders as they are known nationally were centred in nine areas in 
the North and Midlands of England initially, extending to 12 in 2005. The initiative 
attracted £1.2 billion from central government between 2002 and 2008 and a further 
£1billion was committed for 2008-11 (Long, 2010). The Oldham and Rochdale 
Pathfinder in Phillips et al’s study was remarkable because it placed community 
cohesion and involvement firmly in its strategy (Robinson & Pearce 2009). For the 
majority of Pathfinders, however, “community cohesion” was poorly understood, 
initiatives lacked guidance or direction and cohesion was not prioritised (Robinson 
& Pearce 2009). 
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Some local authorities located their HMRI plans in a broader set of over-arching 
priorities. In Liverpool the initiative was linked inextricably to the city’s “urban 
renaissance” ambitions: “During this period we will be consolidating and extending 
the dynamic renaissance of the city and growing its economy” (City of Liverpool 
n.d., para 2.5). The strategic mechanism to address the problems of marginalised 
communities was to attract higher income groups and increase revenue by bolstering 
the number and proportion of higher-rated council tax4 banded properties. Large 
scale clearance (demolition) of properties was envisaged as the means to address 
over-supply and to facilitate new developments in partnership with private and third 
sector property developers. Like other British cities, Liverpool aimed to compete 
with other cities, regionally and globally, to attract investors and consumers. 
Broadening the city’s “cultural offer” through consumption-based and “culture-led” 
projects, such as Liverpool’s European Capital of Culture status during 2008, was 
regarded as the approach through which middle-class re-population and inward 
investment would be secured. Middle-class professionals, preferably young, with 
disposable incomes were therefore pitched as the “ideal” residents in the spaces 
to be gentrified in the city centre and the neighbourhoods beyond (Jones & Wilks-
Heeg 2004; Hancock 2007). 
New Labour’s modernisation agenda embraced a particular variant of 
multiculturalism in its discourse on urban cosmopolitanism, re-vitalisation and 
“social inclusion” but the historically rooted view that poverty in Britain was a 
problem of culture and lifestyle underpinned by welfare dependency was strongly 
reasserted (Haylett 2001). Moreover, 
In these circumstances a representative middle class is positioned at the vanguard 
of ”the modern” which becomes a moral category referring to liberal, cosmopolitan, 
work and consumption based lifestyles and values, and ”the unmodern” on which this 
category depends is the white working-class “other”, emblematically a throwback to 
other times and places (Haylett 2001, 365). 
This backdrop illuminates the kind of “core values” into which Muslims were 
expected to “integrate” (Burnett 2008) and the way “good Muslims” are represented 
outside of the dominant demonising securitization discourse (Brown 2010). 
The neoliberal ideology advanced by New Labour constructs the “good Muslim”, as 
it constructs other “good citizens”, primarily through meritocratic materialism. In this 
sense the “normal Muslim” is the one we can “do business” with, in a quite literal way 
(Brown 2010, 180).
4 The local taxation system operating in the UK. 80% of properties in Liverpool were in the lowest 
bands, A and B (City of Liverpool n.d..para 3.2). 
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The belief at the heart of the community cohesion agenda was that promoting 
social contact brings tangible social benefits. Coupled with the notion that 
economic benefits “trickle down” from more affluent groups to the poor, the view 
that economically disadvantaged residents draw economic benefits from higher 
income groups re-locating into “mixed communities” became common policy 
sense. There was little systematic evidence to support it however:
There are two principal mechanisms by which low income residents might be expected 
to benefit from mixed community approaches: area resources and social interactions. 
There is limited evidence that the new resources that may come with higher income 
residents (e.g. shops) either materialise or are beneficial to people on low incomes 
[because of higher prices and less disposable income as a consequence e.g.]. However, 
there is evidence that area reputations and stigma can be affected in ways not possible 
with less transformational change. There is some evidence that social tolerance might 
be increased through increased visibility of people from other social groups. However, 
a consensus is emerging that groups tend not to actually mix. Mixed communities are 
more likely to deliver shared spaces, than to create broader social networks, positive 
role models and job finding opportunities (Tunstall & Lupton 2010, 3). 
Tunstall and Lupton (2010) concluded from the evidence available that 
social relationships between residents occupying different housing tenures and 
employment statuses tend to be highly circumscribed. The denigration of the 
working-class poor, especially welfare claimants, in New Labour’s political and 
policy discourses and refracted in media representations form part of the wider 
context against which findings such as these must be situated, as I explore below. 
White Working Class “Communities”
McGhee’s (2005; 2006) work reminds us that the importance of preparing “host” 
communities – economically and psychologically – for the arrival and acceptance 
of “new” migrants is acknowledged in the policy documents on “race” equality 
and, in particular, in relation to the National Asylum Dispersal Scheme.5 Such 
preparation however suffered acute neglect and, where it took place, was frequently 
undermined by the overriding preoccupation with deterring asylum seekers and 
managing new migrants as part of the wider securitization agenda. The notion of 
“host community” moreover was conceptualised vaguely, such as by reference to 
the “general public”, or in terms of “risk”, through descriptions such as “far right 
susceptible” (McGhee 2006, 112). White working-class people’s anxieties were 
invoked in justifications for tougher restrictions, exploited by far right extremists 
and, in turn, the dangers posed by the British National Party (BNP) were then 
5 The National Asylum Dispersal Scheme launched in 2000 aimed to “relieve” the pressure of 
settlement on communities and resources in the South East of England (especially London and 
Kent) and to act as a “deterrent” to asylum seekers (McGhee 2006, 121). 
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used to rationalise further deterrent measures, especially in a context where 
tabloid press hyperbole framed the debates (McGhee 2006). Successive Home 
Secretaries have therefore displayed only a very partial understanding of the social 
settings in which far right extremism may be forged, ignored the roles of legislators 
and policy-makers themselves in these processes, and have hinged their efforts 
on “preparing the migrant”6. 
The argument in this section of the paper supports the emphasis McGhee 
(2006) placed on action to address the social and economic problems facing white 
working class communities where “new” migrants may settle (see Reeve 2008) or 
indeed with whom settled Muslim communities are expected to “integrate”. However, 
the pervasive assaults on the cultural integrity of the urban poor (minority groups 
and white working class) reflect and reinforce economic and political marginality 
and provide the justifications for leaving unchallenged the material conditions 
and deprivations that sustain conflicts and I extend McGhee’s arguments in this 
direction. 
A number of writers have made reference to the demonization of the white 
working-class poor and the myriad ways in which social control has been extended 
for these groups in a manner that has some parallels with Muslim communities 
(see Kalra & Kapoor 2009 for example). As McGhee described, commentators of 
different political persuasions have represented working class white communities 
as either “problems” for or “victims” of government policy. The Cohesion Panel 
(2004: 15, see also McGhee 2006: 120), for example, stated that: 
We recognise that inward migration does create tensions and that these do not 
necessarily revolve around race. It is easier for the more affluent communities to 
be tolerant towards newcomers, as they do not perceive them to be a threat. Many 
immigrants will not, initially at least, be able to afford homes in the more affluent areas, 
will not be sending their children to schools in those areas and will not have the skills 
to compete for the higher level of jobs. Indeed, they will often be providing services 
to middle class families, keeping petrol stations open 24 hours a day, working in 
restaurants, and providing au pairs and cleaners.
No evidence however was provided to support the view that middle-class 
“communities” are “more tolerant”, especially towards poor migrants, and the limited 
evidence that exists on mixed income group interaction cited earlier suggests that 
poor and affluent groups do tend to live “parallel lives” even in close proximity. 
More broadly, the assertion in the quotation reflects the binary opposition of the 
“included majority” and the “socially excluded” which hides from view deviance – 
in this case intolerance - in the “included majority” (Young 1999; 2007). As Haylet 
6 Through requiring proficiency in English language, knowledge of Britain, assessed via the 
citizenship test, and the “active citizenship” agenda which was directed toward migrants and “host” 
communities (McGhee 2005; 2006).
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(2001, 365) puts it: “middle-class dependency on working-class “backwardness” 
for its own claim to modern multicultural citizenship is an unspoken interest 
within the discourse of illegitimacy around the white working-class poor”. These 
unspoken class interests were also reflected in urban regeneration and social 
policies where “socially excluded” families and communities are defined as “the 
problems to be fixed” or corrected (Morrison 2003) and in academic discourses in 
more sanitised form (Haylett 2001) where uncritical use of pejorative terms such 
as “underclass” and “sink estate”, for example, are used too frequently to describe 
“host” communities. 
The denigration and demonization of poor working class families and 
communities is, of course, most forcefully represented in UK tabloid press and 
popular television programmes’ fascination with any kind of “dysfunctionality” 
(Mooney & Hancock 2010). From the reality TV shows which feature “experts” (and 
the audience) sitting in judgment of working class lives and lifestyles and offering 
direction to aid their self-improvement (Skeggs 2005) to the tabloid obsession with 
“benefit scroungers”, working class people in disadvantaged areas are represented 
as a hazard to themselves and a threat to the wealth and security of the supposedly 
respectable, aspirational and “law-abiding majority” (Mooney & Hancock 2010). 
Underpinning these discourses is a vociferous anti-welfare message which is 
mobilised in the justifications for reforms to eradicate “welfare dependency” as 
the source of this malaise. Coupled with “penal pornography” (Wacquant 2009, 
xi), which trains its gaze in the same direction, “poverty porn” is a potent force in 
the criminalisation of the urban poor (Mooney & Hancock 2010). “Poverty porn” 
manifests in the hugely distorted but nevertheless widespread portrayal of people 
in poverty in the 24/7 news media, in tabloid newspapers and on popular television 
programmes in the UK which focus on individual failures, cultural deficiencies and 
deficits to the neglect of context, history and structure. These pornographies claim 
to reflect “reality” but in fact serve to shape and reconstruct dominant popular 
and political attitudes to poverty and welfare more generally (Mooney & Hancock 
2010). At least partially informed by these representations, more intensive welfare 
conditionality regimes7 and formal policing practices in urban spaces reflect and 
re-forge relations of power and disadvantage. Reducing “social exclusion” and 
securing property-led regeneration was, for example, regarded as being reliant 
upon “domesticating” problematic lifestyles as much as reducing the perception 
of crime and anti-social behaviour which were deemed obstacles to regenerative 
efforts between 1998 and 2010. New Labour’s “urban renaissance” justified 
targeting policing efforts on the most marginal groups in urban neighbourhoods 
(see Hancock 2007) and intensifying securitization in city centres (Coleman 2009; 
7 The conditions that must be met to claim welfare benefits which include requiring applicants 
to apply for a given number of jobs each week, subjecting to medical assessments for sickness 
benefits, and the sanctions imposed (including loss of benefits) for claimants deemed to fall short of 
these requirements. 
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Coleman 2004; Raco 2003). Furthermore, the problematisation of welfare in 
political and media discourses around the urban poor are mobilised to justify the 
restriction and withdrawal of social welfare support, which I return to later. 
“Host” Communities, Dispersal and the Far Right
The “sites” chosen for the National Asylum Dispersal Scheme which began in 
2000 were designated primarily because housing was available. Other criteria 
were accorded far less importance but nevertheless included a) that there should 
be established multi-ethnic populations and b) voluntary organisations to provide 
support should be available (Audit Commission 2000 in McGhee 2005, 70). Not 
surprisingly in view of the fragility of the housing markets in the dispersal sites 
located primarily in the northern towns, the localities8 offered few employment 
opportunities. Welfare services were hard-pressed and against a backdrop 
where competition over scarce urban resources was intense the risk of hostility 
and violence towards incoming residents ought to have been a priority (McGhee 
2005). However, while the government ignored or downplayed the importance of 
preparing “host” communities, far right extremists did not; the BNP capitalised on 
and cultivated the widespread perception that local white populations were “losing 
out” to asylum seekers and racialised and religious minorities (McGhee 2005). 
The BNP increased its support in local elections during the first decade of the 
21st century (Bowyer 2008; Wilks-Heeg 2009). The party won two seats in the 
2009 European parliamentary elections (the North West and Yorks and Humber 
constituencies) with a 6.2% share of the vote. Analyses preceding that election 
showed BNP support was concentrated in economically disadvantaged urban areas 
but less so in the most diverse neighbourhoods (Bowyer 2008; Ford & Goodwin 
2010). Bowyer’s (2008) contextual analysis suggested that housing markets were 
more significant than labour markets, supporting the view that competition for 
scarce urban resources has been influential. 
The impact of deteriorating local social and economic conditions combined with 
the failure of the main political parties (especially Labour) to effectively reach these 
voters (see Wilks-Heeg 2009; Goodman 2010) led many commentators to predict 
growing BNP support as the economy descended into recession and ‘austerity’ 
dominated government responses in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. 
Despite the confidence the BNP derived from media attention following their 
European election successes, however, it was unable to build on its gains in 2010 
(Lowles 2010). What is more, by this time their self-proclaimed role as “defenders 
8 Glasgow, Greater Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Birmingham, Stoke on Trent, Bradford and 
Hull, for example.
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of ‘White spaces’” and “white rights” (McGhee 2005), their part in the maintenance 
of segregated spaces in cities and their demands for the further securitization of 
national borders were increasingly being shared with the English Defence League 
(EDL), which grew rapidly from 2009 (Searchlight 2010). The EDL makes no claim 
to be a political party and does not seek electoral respectability; it regards itself 
as “a movement” and is considered “the biggest threat to community cohesion in 
Britain today” (Searchlight 2010). Organised primarily through social networking 
sites on the internet and via football hooligan networks, the EDL hold street 
protests in localities with relatively large Muslim populations. Their activities are 
specifically designed to exploit tensions between communities and are frequently 
accompanied by violence (Searchlight 2010). 
It is important to acknowledge the local activities to foster hospitality towards 
asylum seekers in “host” communities (Goodman 2010), innovative local community 
safety initiatives (Hughes 2007) and anti-racist and anti-fascist groups that organise 
to oppose the BNP and the EDL. However, cuts to urban programmes, welfare 
entitlements and the longevity of the economic crisis suggest the persistence of 
“economic pessimism” amongst individuals and groups – a predictor of far right 
party support (Ford & Goodwin 2010) - as the next section explores.
Insecurity and Austerity
UK cities’ regeneration programmes, from the 1990s, became increasingly entwined 
with measures to augment the “resilience” of urban centres against terrorist attack or 
other disaster (Coaffee et al 2008). These priorities invoked local authority officials 
and their partners to rely less on the conspicuous “fortification” of urban spaces and 
more and more on sophisticated surveillance systems, especially CCTV, as well as 
new forms of regulation to promote “safety”, “quality of life” and “sustainability” to 
promote property and consumer-led regeneration strategies (Coaffee et al 2008; 
Coleman 2004). The intensification of territorial-based social control through such 
measures as Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs), Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBOs), orders attached to criminal convictions (CRASBOs); Dispersal 
Orders (Section 30 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003) and the like added 
to the already well-developed collection of regulatory mechanisms practiced by 
social landlords (Burney 2005) and the police in urban neighbourhoods, as we 
have seen. These measures were regarded as essential pre-requisites for renewal, 
the settlement of new (more affluent) residents and to address “social exclusion” 
(Hancock 2006a; 2006b; 2007). For the more economically disadvantaged and 
politically less powerful (working-class young people, for example), whose street-
presence is most common-place, however, these powers frequently exacerbated 
their insecurity in public space (Hancock 2006a). 
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New Labour’s flagship HMRI urban programme aimed to revive weak housing 
markets, as noted above, and relied in large part on private and third sector 
developers to do so. Not surprisingly the programme became vulnerable following 
the financial crisis in 2008 and the rapidly diminishing market for credit which 
followed. In Liverpool, for example, renewal “slowed down” and, because little 
demand was evident, some units intended for the private market were converted 
to social use. Flats and terraced houses in the HMRI “Pathfinder area” and in the 
north of Liverpool were badly hit by falling prices. More generally, the recession 
manifested itself unevenly within the city; the more affluent suburbs saw house 
prices fall by 3.5% on average between December 2007 and June 2009; in the city 
centre by 22% in same period, but in the inner core prices plummeted by more than 
a third. City centre new builds were badly affected, and repossessions increased 
between Jan and June 2009 by nearly 94% compared with the same period in 
2008 (City of Liverpool 2010).
The HMRI was jeopardised further following the election of the Conservative-
led coalition government in May 2010 and its announcement to withdraw funding in 
October the same year. In the Liverpool HMRI pathfinder area over 800 properties 
awaited demolition in the clearance areas and many residents remained isolated 
in their “blighted” neighbourhoods unable to move (Cooper 2011; see also Mason 
2011). In the north Liverpool area of Anfield alone 657 occupied properties were 
still to be bought and demolished at the time of the announcement (Bartlett & 
Waddington 2011). 
Over the course of the preceding decade most of the HMRI pathfinders housed 
increasingly ethnically diverse populations (Robinson & Pearce 2009). In Kensington 
(Liverpool)9, for example, the 1991 Census is likely to have underestimated black 
and minority ethnic groups at a little over 5% of the population, but by 2001 the 
percentage had risen to 13.7%10, and was estimated to be around 20% by 2009 
(Russell 2009, 7). Just fewer than 9% were non-EU nationals. Some new migrants 
were students, others incomers from the wider region and, as part of Liverpool’s 
role in the National Asylum Dispersal Scheme, asylum seekers and refugees 
made up an increasing proportion over the lifetime of the NDC and HMRI (Russell 
2009). Furthermore, neighbourhood blight, its associated disorder and economic 
consequences “amplify the importance of cleavages, especially along racial lines” 
(Letki 2005 in Kalra & Kapoor 2009, 1410; see also Skogan 1990 in Hancock 2001) 
and neighbourhood instability has been related to residents’ concerns and worries 
about safety (Taylor 1997, in Hancock 2001, 78). These problems are likely to 
9 Kensington was a New Deal for Communities (NDC) site and later part of the HMRI area (Russell 
2009).
10 3.5% described their ethnicity as “Mixed race”; 2.8% Asian or British Asian; 2.6% Black or Black 
British and 4.7% Chinese or “Other” (Russell 2009, 7).
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become significantly more pronounced as a consequence of Coalition austerity 
measures.
The Coalition government claimed its Regional Growth Fund provided a possible 
source of funding to make up the shortfall in HMRI funding. The fund (£1.4bn for 
2011-14 according to the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) 2010) 
aims to assist the “re-balancing” of local economies towards the private sector, 
especially in regions such as these that are regarded as “over-dependent” on the 
state, in line with the government’s neoliberal ambitions. Three quarters of bids in 
the first round came from partnerships in the ethnically diverse but economically 
depressed North West, West Midlands, North East and Yorkshire and Humber areas 
of England. Total bids across England ran to £2.78bn (BIS 2011). However, hopes of 
filling the gaps left by cutting HMRI funding through this source were crushed when 
the UK Parliament’s Communities and Local Government Committee was advised 
that “The regional growth fund is not in any way a replacement for the housing 
market renewal funding...There is no way in which we are doing housing renewal.” 
(Lord Heseltine cited by Luciana Berger MP, Hansard 12 July 2011 Column 28WH). 
Instead, a £30m transition fund was made available for authorities in the five areas 
most badly affected. The amount required to complete the initiative in Liverpool 
alone however was estimated to be £120m (Luciana Berger MP, Hansard 12 July 
2011 Columns 28 and 29WH). 
The local administrations in the north and midlands, like their counterparts 
in inner-London which contain the most economically disadvantaged localities 
in the south of England (Newham, Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Newham), are 
struggling with disproportionate cuts to their budgets compared to those in the 
most affluent areas (Curtis 2010). Central government funding for local authorities 
is bearing a large share of the government’s £81bn deficit reduction programme; 
councils face a 28% reduction in their budgets in real terms to 2015, the largest 
cuts occurring in 2011-12. Capital funding has been reduced by an estimated 45% 
(LGA, 2010). Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s ambition to grow the “Big Society” 
through voluntary sector delivery of services in the gaps left by cuts to central or 
local government provision for the most economically marginal areas and groups 
appears unconvincing.
Many charities and voluntary organisations supporting the most disadvantaged 
groups rely on non-“ring-fenced” local authority grants (BBC 2011b) and have 
reduced their programmes and staff quotas as council budgets have shrunk; more 
than 2000 charities have found themselves in this position at the time of writing 
(Ramesh 2011). Other revenue streams relied upon by third sector organisations 
are also facing savage cuts (Legal Aid funding, for example). Charities offering 
assistance to refugees and asylum seekers have found their activities destabilised 
by cuts of 62% to UK Border Agency (UKBA) funding (Refugee Council 2011) and 
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the removal of immigration cases from the scope of Legal Aid. Refugee and Migrant 
Justice (RMJ) and the Immigration Advisory Service (IAS), both large not-for-
profit organisations, have gone into administration (Robins 2011) and the Refugee 
Integration and Employment Service (RIES) ceased operations in September 2011 
(Hill 2011). 
In view of the importance of housing markets and welfare provision for patterns 
of residential settlement and because the socio-economic context of localities 
strongly influence social relations between social groups, reductions in housing 
subsidies11 are particularly germane to the present discussion. A more thorough 
consideration of the Coalition’s urban and social policies lies beyond the scope 
of this paper but the legislative programme more broadly shows a conspicuous 
disregard for community cohesion12.
Housing Benefit Reforms as a Revanchist Measure?
The notion of urban revanchism13 has been debated primarily in relation to 
the gentrification of city spaces and the eviction and displacement of the poor 
(Smith 2005). It describes a political strategy which “embodies a revengeful and 
reactionary viciousness against various populations accused of ‘stealing’ the 
city” (Smith 2005, xv). Research in a variety of jurisdictions has often focused on 
national legislation, local bye-laws and police action to remove homeless people 
from urban neighbourhoods to enhance the “quality of life” for affluent newcomers 
and to improve the investment opportunities for corporate developers (see Smith 
2005). The thesis is not without critics or qualification (see Johnsen and Fitzpatrick 
2010, for example), but the notion of “revanchism” usefully captures the sense of 
vengeance contained in urban social policies towards welfare benefit claimants, 
especially in what are regarded as the more affluent sectors of UK cities (especially 
London) in the current period. Inasmuch as the Coalition’s proposal to cut housing 
benefit by 10% for people claiming Job Seekers’ Allowance for twelve months 
or more was withdrawn in February 2011, for example, it nonetheless indicated 
the government’s direction of travel. These provisions were widely condemned 
for punishing claimants irrespective of their efforts to find work, labour market 
disadvantage or experience of discrimination. 
11 Housing Benefit (HB) is paid to qualifying tenants in the social rented sector and Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) is paid to qualifying tenants in the private rented sector. Both are means tested.
12 The UK Government’s Open Public Services White Paper (2011) raises profound concerns in 
this regard for example. 
13 Translated as “revenge” (Smith 2005, 43).
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From October 2011 the calculation of local housing allowances will be based on 
the 30th percentile of rents in Broad Rental Market Areas14 rather than the median 
(50th percentile), and reforms scheduled for 2013 to 2015 will see subsidies increase 
in line with the (usually lower) Consumer Prices Index rather than the Retail Price 
Index which includes housing costs. These changes will not only diminish the pool 
of available properties for rent, reconfigure how and where the poor are housed in 
urban space but will depress further the meagre disposable incomes of claimants. 
The reforms revise downwards the weekly caps on the allowances payable for a 
range of property sizes; properties containing more than four bedrooms will no 
longer be supported. Ceasing to provide for larger properties will disproportionately 
impact upon larger families and households, especially in the London region, 
some minority ethnic households and families with dependent children (who are 
also more likely to experience poverty)15. Young people will also be particularly 
adversely affected; the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee 
(2010, 31) reported that: 
The Valuation Office Agency has calculated what the June 2010 LHA rates would have 
been if they were calculated at the 30th percentile rather than the median. These show 
that a young person renting a room in shared accommodation in Inner North London 
stands to lose £25 per week in LHA if the changes go ahead. This would represent 
nearly half of their weekly £51.85 JSA payment.
Furthermore, the Committee heard that the “shared room rate” – a lower level 
of benefit for those aged up to 25 – had been found to be wholly inadequate for 
securing suitable accommodation. Considerable subsidies from the earnings (or 
benefits) of young people were necessary even before the reduction in subsidy to 
the 30th percentile of rents takes place. Under this package of reforms the lower 
rates will be extended to single people aged up to 35. 
One of the stated aims of these measures was to 
provide a fairer and more sustainable Housing Benefit scheme by taking steps to ensure 
that people on benefit are not living in accommodation that would be out of the reach 
of most people in work, creating a fairer system for low-income working families and 
for the taxpayer. It will avoid the present situation where Housing Benefit recipients are 
able to live in very expensive properties in areas that most working people supporting 
themselves would have no prospect of being able to afford (Department for Work & 
Pensions (DWP) 2010a). 
In contrast to the impression invoked in this quotation (and repeated frequently 
in the media and political discourses surrounding these reforms), however, housing 
14 Administrative units for calculating rents and subsidies.
15 House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee (2010). 
Social Cohesion, Securitization and Counter-terrorism
40
benefit claimants include low paid workers, people claiming sickness benefits, 
pensioners who have retired as well as the unemployed, as the aforementioned 
Select Committee noted. Many informed commentators have concluded that as a 
consequence of these reforms low paid workers in London will be forced to move 
away from the city, beyond reasonable travel to work distances, and in the capital 
as well as elsewhere more exclusively affluent areas and “ghettoization” for the 
most disadvantaged will be encouraged. Crisis (a homeless charity), for example, 
argued that:
Reducing Housing Benefit rates will move people away from their jobs and future 
employment opportunities, disrupt children’s education and damage local communities. 
Poorer people will become concentrated in areas with lower rents risking ghettoisation, 
an increased burden on public services and real implications for mixed communities 
(Crisis 2010).
The DWP informed the Select Committee that it will “discuss the impact of 
people moving address and needing to find new childcare, schools and health 
services” and added that “some customers will need to move away from extended 
family support networks; this however reflects the choices that most people in work 
also have to make” (2010, 44 [my emphasis]). The persistent and erroneous view 
that HB and HLA are “out of work” benefits is, yet again, clearly reflected here (see 
also Mooney & Hancock 2010). Moreover, extreme and wholly unrepresentative 
examples drawn from the tabloid press of households purportedly claiming colossal 
amounts in housing benefit were employed by the Chancellor, George Osborne, to 
justify these reforms (Booth 2010; Crisis 2010). “Welfare dependency” is the evil 
to be addressed (DWP 2010b); the structural causes of poverty, unemployment, 
uneven development, discrimination and low wages have been effectively erased 
from current policy discourses. 
Conclusion
The UK Coalition government’s social policies signify an unambiguous departure 
from the way community cohesion was regarded as a means to respond to insecurity 
under New Labour’s urban programmes. Furthermore, while the previous Labour 
government was committed rhetorically at least to multiculturalism recent Prime 
Ministerial pronouncements have branded “state multiculturalism” as part of the 
problem which produced “segregation” and “extremism” (BBC 2011a). “Assimilation” 
into “British values” has materialized as the government’s explicit policy to an even 
greater extent. Following a long line of former incumbents, the structural causes 
of “segregation” have been defeated in favour of the dominant political ideology 
of the day. David Cameron’s speech on 5th February 2011 contained an attempt 
to distinguish between Islam and “Islamic extremism” (BBC 2011a) and could 
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have provided an opportunity to condemn far right extremism directed at Muslims. 
Instead it signalled continuity with his earlier counterparts in the way Muslim 
communities were singled out. Indeed, the coincidence of this event with the EDL 
holding one of their biggest rallies in their history (in Luton) provided succour to 
these Islamophobic protesters. 
The preoccupation with disadvantaged communities as “problematic 
communities” which precedes New Labour has been made even more explicit in 
the current justification for public spending cuts and welfare reform, especially in 
the wake of urban disorders in English cities during August 2011 (Cameron 2011). 
Furthermore, diminishing welfare support is likely to promote family dislocation, 
economic insecurity, and neighbourhood instability which nurture urban divisions 
and conflict. In this unforgiving setting, asylum seekers and refugees who have 
borne the brunt of securitization measures on the borders will need to contend with 
the systematic withdrawal of support that was already pitiful (Burnett 2011). 
The preceding discussion illustrates the significance of a wider frame of 
reference for understanding the problem of “security” in urban spaces which so 
often is conceived in narrow, technological and “risk-focused” terms defined by 
the state. Broader notions of “security” which recognise and support the cultural 
integrity of communities (minority ethnic groups and white working-class) are 
essential for critical analysis; systematic attacks on the “culture” and “lifestyles” of the 
urban poor both reflect and perpetuate the political and economic marginalization 
of communities. These discourses help to forge a context in which groups and 
communities become “morally excluded” from wider society and, in turn, excluded 
from “resources, rights and fair treatment” (Tyler et al 1997: 216). 
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